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ABSTRACT
Adversarial attacks have always been a serious threat for any
data-driven model. In this paper, we explore subspaces of ad-
versarial examples in unitary vector domain, and we propose
a novel detector for defending our models trained for envi-
ronmental sound classification. We measure chordal distance
between legitimate and malicious representation of sounds in
unitary space of generalized Schur decomposition and show
that their manifolds lie far from each other. Our front-end de-
tector is a regularized logistic regression which discriminates
eigenvalues of legitimate and adversarial spectrograms. The
experimental results on three benchmarking datasets of en-
vironmental sounds represented by spectrograms reveal high
detection rate of the proposed detector for eight types of ad-
versarial attacks and outperforms other detection approaches.
Index Terms— Generalized Schur decomposition, chordal
distance, adversarial subspace, adversarial detection.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the field of sound and speech processing, it is very com-
mon to use 2D representations of audio signals for training
data-driven algorithms for both regression and classification
tasks. Such 2D representations have lower dimensional-
ity than audio waveforms and they easily fit advanced deep
learning architectures mainly developed for computer vision
applications. Mel frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC),
short-time Fourier transformation (STFT), discrete wavelet
transformation (DWT) are among the most pervasive 2D
signal representations which essentially visualize frequency-
magnitude distribution of a given reconstructed signal over
time. Thus far, the best sound classification accuracy has
been achieved for deep learning algorithms trained on 2D
signal representations [1, 2]. However, it has been shown that
despite achieving high performance, the approaches based
on 2D representations are very vulnerable against adversarial
attacks [3]. Unfortunately, this poses a strict security issue
because crafted adversarial examples not only mislead the
target model toward a wrong label, but also, they are transfer-
able to other models including conventional algorithms such
as support vector machines (SVM) [3].
There are some discussions about existence, origin, and
behavior of adversarial examples, notably their linear char-
acteristics [4], but there is no reliable approach to discrim-
inate their underlying subspace(s) compared to legitimate
examples. In an effort to characterize possible adversarial
subspaces, some detectors have been introduced. They are
mainly based on a statistical comparison on predictions of
the victim model. Feinman et al. [5] have proposed to esti-
mate kernel density (KD) and Bayesian uncertainty (BU) of a
trained deep neural network (DNN) for triplets of legitimate,
noisy, and adversarial examples. All these measurements
have been carried out with the assumption of approximating
a DNN to a deep Gaussian process and they result in high
ratios of KD and BU for adversarial examples compared to
legitimate and noisy samples. Measuring maximum mean
discrepancy and energy distance of examples are two other
statistical metrics for investigating adversarial manifolds us-
ing divergence of model predictions for clusters of datapoints
[6]. In addition to these output-level statistical measurements,
logits of adversariality have been carefully assessed in each
subnetwork placed on top of some hidden units of the victim
model [7] as well as measuring instability of potential layers
to perturbations [8]. Ma et al. [9] presented a comprehensive
study for characterizing adversarial manifolds and introduced
local intrinsic dimensionality (LID) score, which measures ℓ2
distance of network prediction for a given example compared
to prediction logits of its k neighbours at each hidden unit.
The actual detector is a logistic regression binary classifier
trained on one class made up of LID vectors of legitimate
and noisy examples because they lie in a very close subspace
and another class made up of LID vectors of adversarial ex-
amples generated by strong attacks. Experimental results on
several datasets have shown the competitive performance of
the LID detector compared to KD and BU [9]. Unfortunately,
it has been shown that these detectors of adversarial exam-
ples might fail to detect strong adversarial attacks in adverse
scenarios [10, 11], due to the difficulty in tuning detectors or
even due to the particular characteristics of the datasets.
In this paper we show that, adversarial manifolds lie far
from legitimate and noisy examples using a unitary space-
based chordal distance metric. We also provide an algorithm
for proactively detect potential malicious examples using
generalized Schur decomposition (a.k.a. QZ decomposition)
[12]. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a brief explanation of unitary space of QZ as well as our ad-
versarial detection algorithm. Experimental results on DWT
representation of three environmental sound datasets are dis-
cussed in the Section 3. Conclusions and perspectives of
future work are presented in the last section.
2. ADVERSARIAL DETECTION
Computing norm metrics is a common approach for measur-
ing the similarity between crafted adversarial examples and
their legitimate counterparts. In addition to basic norms such
as l2 and l∞, human visual inference oriented metric has been
also embedded in general optimization problems [13]. These
similarity constraints are probably the most valuable clues in
studying possible subspaces of crafted examples.
It has been shown that, regardless of the category or type
of adversarial attack, the generated examples, subject to a
similarity constraint, lie in a sub-Cartesian space further than
the legitimate ones [9]. However, this is tricky and may not
work correctly for strong attacks [11]. Our detailed study of
the failure cases of such detectors uncovered imperfection of
Cartesian metric space (distance-based) for exploring adver-
sarial subspaces. Therefore, vector spaces that may discrimi-
nate between adversarial and legitimate manifolds can be very
useful to build robust adversarial example detectors.
We investigate in this paper the mapping of input samples
to the vector space of generalized Schur decomposition and
the use of chordal distance to identify their underlying sub-
spaces.
2.1. Schur Decomposition and Chordal Distance
For computing generalized Schur decomposition of two spec-
trograms denoted asM1 andM2 in a complex set C
n×n there
should exist unitary matrices Q and Z such that:
QHM1Z = T, Q
HM2Z = S (1)
where S and T are upper (quasi) triangular and QH denotes
the conjugate transpose of Q. The eigenvalues (λ) ofM1 and
M2 can be approximated as:
λ(M1,M2) = {tii/sii : sii 6= 0} (2)
where tii and sii are diagonal elements of T and S, respec-
tively, and λ(M1,M2) = C for some zero-valued diagonal
entries of S and T . In other words, super-resolution similar-
ity between two spectrograms can be calculated as:
det(M1 − λM2) = det
(
QZH
) n∏
i=1
(tii − λsii) (3)
Implied by Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem [12], the bounded
basis matrices of
{
(Qk, Zk)
}
support limi→∞(Qk, Zk) =
(Q,Z). The unitary subsequence of Zk leads to the following
relation:
ZHk (M
−1
2,kQk) = S
−1
k (4)
which asymptotically implies QHk
(
M1M
−1
2
Qk
)
equivalent
to generic Schur decomposition of M1M
−1
2,k for nonsingular
basis matrices of
{
M2,k
}
.
In perturbing the spectrogram Mi where M˜i ≃ Mi + ǫ
increases considerably the chance of noticeable variations in
the resulting eigenvalues/eigenvectors [12]. Theoretically, we
can measure it using the chordal metric where the pencil of
~µiMi−M˜i is the point of interest for µi ∈
{(
tii, sii
)
|sii/tii
}
perturbed by ǫ as conditioned in Eq. 5.∥∥∥Mi − M˜i∥∥∥
2
≃ ǫi (5)
where ǫi is a very small perturbation. The chordal distance for
the vectors of eigenvalues associated with pencil of ~µiMi −
M˜i can be measured by Eq. 6 [12].
chord(λi, λi,ǫ) =
|λi − λi,ǫ|√
1 + λ2i
√
1 + λ2i,ǫ
(6)
where pencils are neither necessarily bound to be normalized
nor differentiable. For any adversarial attack that perturbs a
legitimate spectrogram Mi by ǫi, we compute chordal dis-
tance as Eq. 6 and we compare the distances obtained to find
separable manifolds for legitimate and adversarial examples.
2.2. Adversarial Subspace
We can explore the properties of adversarial examples using
chordal distance in unitary space of eigenvectors where each
spectrogram is represented by basis functionsQi and Zi. For
any legitimate and adversarial spectrograms, the chordal dis-
tance between their associated eigenvalues (λ, λi,ǫ) must sat-
isfy the constraint defined in Eq. 7 [12].
chord(λi, λi,ǫ) ≤
ǫ√[(
yHMix
)
+
(
yHM˜ix
)]2 (7)
where x and y satisfy Mix = λM˜ix and y
HMi = λy
HM˜i
for the symmetric in the upper bound of Mi and M˜i. The
extreme case for the defined pencil may happen when both
sii and tii are zero. Therefore, we can replace their division
with a small random value close to their neighbours.
Not only satisfying Eq. 5 is required for properly comput-
ing chordal distance of eigenvalues, but it must also be part of
the optimization procedure of any adversarial attack because
the perturbation value ǫ should not be perceivable. For adver-
sarial perturbations, an adjustment of the chordal distance by
a factor γ is also required (chord(λi, λi,ǫ) + γi). The value
of such a hyperparameter should be very small and associated
to mean eigenvalue, otherwise it might cause ill-conditioning
cases. We examine the effects of different pencil perturba-
tions on the chordal distance and inequality of Eq. 7 from
random noisy to carefully optimized adversarials in Section 3.
2.3. Adversarial Discrimination
In practice, detecting adversarial examples using chordal dis-
tance for a given test input requires access to its reference
spectrogram as well as to the perturbation ǫ. However, this is
not feasible for real life applications. For rectifying this issue,
we propose to compare eigenvalues of legitimate and adver-
sarial examples to draw a decision boundary between them.
To this end, we train a logistic regression on the eigenvalues of
legitimate and adversarial examples as shown in Algorithm 1.
For every spectrogram pairs randomly picked from an
identical class, we compute their associated eigenvalues us-
ing QZ decomposition. We assume that spectrograms have
been generated for short audio signals and they share signif-
icant similarities, especially when they are split into smaller
batches.
Algorithm 1 Discriminating adversarial examples from legit-
imate ones using their associated eigenvectors.
Require: Cleg: Class of legitimate samples
Ensure: Detector
[
schur(M)
]
⊲ M : test spectrogram
1: Λleg = [] , Λadv = [] ⊲ lists
2: for Bleg in Cleg do ⊲ Bleg : legitimate batch
3: Badv := adversarial attack on Bleg
⊲ Badv: adversarial batch
4:
−→
λ leg = eigen
[
qz
(
Bleg
[
i
]
, Bleg
[
j
])]
⊲ i 6= j
5:
−→
λ adv = eigen
[
qz
(
Badv
[
i
]
, Badv
[
j
])]
⊲ i 6= j
6: Λleg .append
(
−→
λ leg
)
, Λadv.append
(
−→
λ adv
)
7: Detector
[
schur(M)
]
= train a classifier on (Λleg , Λadv)
For a test input spectrogramM , its eigenvalues generated
by Schur decomposition will be used as arguments for the fi-
nal front-end classifier (the detector) as relations of these two
decomposition have been explained in Section 2.1. Gener-
alizing this algorithm to a multiclass classification problem
requires computing eigenvectors of inter-class samples shar-
ing no significant similarity due to causing ill-conditioned de-
composition for pencils.
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we study the performance of computing
chordal distance on adversarial detection and we evaluate
the performance of the proposed detector in adverse sce-
narios on three environmental sound datasets: ESC-10 [14],
ESC-50 [14], and UrbanSound8k [15]. The first dataset in-
cludes 400 five-second length audio recordings of 10 classes.
It is actually a simplified version of ESC-50 which has 2000
samples of 50 classes with the same length. The Urban-
Sound8k dataset contains 8732 samples (≤ 4s) of 10 classes
and compared to the first two datasets, it provides more sam-
ple diversity both in terms of quality and quantity.
We apply pitch-shifting operation as part of 1D signal
augmentation as proposed in [2]. This low-level data aug-
mentation increases the chance of learning more discriminant
features by the classifier, especially for ESC-10 and ESC-
50 compared to UrbanSound8k. Four pitch-shifting scales,
namely 0.75, 0.9, 1.15, 1.5 are applied to each sample in or-
der to add four new samples to the legitimate sets. These
hyperparameters are reported to be the most effective scales
for the benchmarking datasets [2]. The wavelet mother func-
tion which we use for producing DWT spectrogram represen-
tations is complex Morlet. Sampling frequencies and frame
length are set to 8 kHz and 50 ms for ESC-10 and Urban-
Sound8k and 16 kHz and 30 ms for ESC-50 with fixed over-
lapping ratio of 0.5 for all datasets [1]. The convolution of
the Morlet function with the signal produces a complex func-
tion with considerable overlap between real and imaginary
parts. Therefore, for representing real spectrograms we use
linear, logarithmic, and logarithmic real visualizations. The
first visualization scheme highlights high-frequency magni-
tudes which denote high variation areas. Low-frequency in-
formation has been characterized by a logarithmic operation
which expands their distances. Energy of the signal, which is
associated with the signal’s mean, has been obtained by ap-
plying a logarithmic filter on the real part.
Since the frequency-magnitude of a signal distributed
over time has variational dimensions, none of the three men-
tioned visualizations produce square spectrograms. Hence,
we bilinearly interpolate each spectrogram to fit square size
with respect to this constraint of QZ decomposition. The
actual size of the spectrograms for ESC-10 and ESC-50 is
1536×768 and 1168×864 for UrbanSound8k because the
latter has shorter audio recordings of at least one second. Fi-
nal size of spectrogram after downsampling and interpolation
is 768×768. This lossy operation may remove some pivotal
frequency information and consequently it may decrease the
performance of the classifier. However, obtaining the highest
recognition accuracy is not our point of interest in this paper,
but studying adversarial subspaces.
For the choice of the victim classifier, we use an SVM and
a convolutional neural network (ConvNet) to compare detec-
tion rate of the proposed detector for variety of adversarial
attacks. In SVM configuration, we use scikit-learn [16] with
a grid search. Linear, polynomial, and RBF kernels have been
tested on the 2/3 of the shuffled datasets (training and devel-
opment). The best recognition accuracy on the test set was
achieved with the RBF kernel with about 72.056%, 71.257%,
72.362% for ESC-10, ESC-50 and UrbanSound8k datasets,
respectively. The proposed ConvNet has four convolutional
layers with receptive field 3×3, stride 1×1, and 128, 256,
Table 1. The mean γ values for justifying chordal distances of adversarial examples, the corresponding mean perturbation and
the recognition accuracy of victim models (ConvNet & SVM) on adversarial sets.
FGSM BIM-a BIM-b JSMA CWA Opt EA LFA
γ 7± 0.12 6± 0.03 8± 0.017 7± 0.17 11± 0.09 10± 0.27 8± 0.39 12± 0.16
ℓ2 5.637 4.015 6.371 6.187 4.426 5.067 NA NA
Accuracy (%) 3.036 6.017 4.964 3.189 6.237 8.143 15.157 17.845
NA: Not Applicable.
Table 2. Mean class-wise comparison of the AUC (%) achieved by the adversarial detectors for spectrograms attacked with
eight adversarial attacks. The best results are highlighted in bold.
ConvNet SVM
Detector FGSM BIM-a BIM-b JSMA CWA Opt EA LFA
KD 65.234 88.097 87.914 63.552 61.025 86.105 55.479 63.659
BU 39.025 80.673 55.474 80.603 58.022 69.207 57.861 67.610
KD+BU 74.381 91.154 88.243 89.251 64.349 90.461 58.330 69.008
LID 79.299 93.097 94.671 91.665 75.297 94.781 70.981 71.239
Proposed 84.132 96.519 95.349 94.375 89.957 93.309 75.227 71.198
512, and 128 filters, respectively. On top of the last con-
volution layer there are two fully connected layers of sizes
256 and 128. All layers use ReLU activation function, ex-
cept the output layer for which softmax is used. Batch and
weight normalization have been applied at all convolutional
layers. Such a ConvNet can achieve recognition performance
of 73.415%, 73.674%, and 75.376% for ESC-10, ESC-50,
and UrbanSound8k datasets respectively on the 1/3 test set.
We attack the ConvNet by fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [4], basic iterative methods (BIM-a and BIM-
b) [17], Jacobian-based salience map attack (JSMA) [18],
optimization-based attack (Opt) [19], and Carlini & Wagner
attack (CWA) [20]. For the SVMmodel, we use label flipping
attack (LFA) [21] and evasion attack (EA) [22]. Overall, for
each legitimate DWT spectrogram (Mi), eight adversarial ex-
amples are crafted (M˜i,j for j = 1 . . . 8). For each pencil of
µiMi−M˜i,j , we measure their chordal distances using Eq. 6,
then for a random unit 2-norm x and y matrices, we check for
the inequality as stated in Eq. 7 and required γ adjustments.
Similarly, we add random Gaussian noise to each Mi with
zero mean and σ ∈
{
0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.05
}
and build pencil
of µiMi − Ni,k where Ni,j for k = 1 . . . 4 denote the noisy
spectrograms which also satisfy Eq. 5. Table 1 summarizes
the adjustment of γ required for crafted adversarial exam-
ples to satisfy Eq. 7. For the generated noisy samples, an
adjustment of γ to 0.5 ± 0.012 is needed, which is averaged
over different values of σ. Considerable displacement be-
tween chordal distance adjustments required for adversarial
and noisy spectrogram sets denote their non-identical and
dissimilar subspaces.
For testing the performance of the Algorithm 1 in discrim-
inating adversarial from legitimate examples, we use all the
attacks mentioned above for crafting Badv. Regularized lo-
gistic regression has been used as the front-end classifier for
discriminatingΛleg from Λadv. We compare the performance
of the proposed detector versus LID, KD, BU, and the combi-
nation KD+BU. Table 2 shows that the proposed detector out-
performs other detectors for the majority of the attacks. The
proposed detector can be used for MFCC and STFT represen-
tations of sounds or even other datasets commonly used for
computer vision applications. The key challenge in this de-
tector is its sensitivity to intra-class sample similarities, oth-
erwise it may not satisfy Eq.7, especially for black-box mul-
ticlass discrimination.
4. CONCLUSION
Since adversarial examples are visually very similar to the le-
gitimate samples, differentiating their underlying subspaces
is very challenging in metric space of Cartesian. In this paper
we showed that offset between subspace of legitimate spec-
trograms compared to their associated adversarial examples
can be measured by a metric called chordal distance defined
in unitary vector space of generalized Schur decomposition.
Using this metric, we demonstrated that manifold of adversar-
ial examples lie far from legitimates and noisy samples which
have been slightly perturbed by Gaussian filters.
In order to detect any adversarial attacks when there is
no access neither to reference spectrogram nor adversarial
perturbation, we proposed a detector which is a regularized
logistic regression model for discriminating eigenvalues of a
malicious spectrogram from legitimates. Experimental results
on three benchmarking environmental sound datasets showed
our proposed detector outperforms other detectors for six out
of eight different adversarial attacks. For future studies, we
would like to improve chordal distance to better characterize
adversarial manifolds and also study possibility of encoding
this metric directly into the adversarial detector.
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